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The following is a continuation of a previous post, “A Path To Permissionless Liquid Staking,” which is an overview of Lido DAO and decentralized liquid staking. In that post, the Nethermind Cryptography Research team outlined the problems of building such a protocol and put forward a collaboration proposal on how to go about solving them.
In this blog post, we are proud to share with the community the outputs from Phase 1 of this work proposal, which produced a systematization of knowledge on the fields of Decentralized Identity and Verifiable Credentials.
In this systematization of knowledge, we examine the current innovations and approaches to the field of decentralized identity (also self-sovereign identity), as well as its relevant foundations. In the words of the Ethereum foundation, decentralized identity is “the idea that identity-related information should be self-controlled, private, and portable.” Accordingly, an introductory article by Dock Labs defines decentralized identity as “a type of identity management that allows people to control their own digital identity without depending on a specific service provider.”
Users can construct their decentralized identities from various data sources: interactions on a blockchain, information gathered from major social networks or centralized websites, and even an ID issued by a government or an educational institution. Self-sovereign identity implementations then store this data (encrypted or not) in a document on a distributed ledger, such as a blockchain. This document is associated with a set of keys that the user controls and can be used to assert ownership of the data.
Furthermore, to facilitate access and communication, the document is tagged with a unique identifier from which a URL to the document can be derived. This ID is known as a decentralized identifier (DID — not to confuse with decentralized identity, which may use DIDs).
To utilize this identity, users can request or create verifiable credentials (VCs). VCs are cryptographically-verifiable claims to a third party about the data conforming to their identity or properties. Verifiable credentials give the user control of which information is shown and provide information requesters tools to combat forgery and fraud.
Understanding current solutions in the landscape of self-sovereign identity is relevant to Lido’s aim of increasing the quality of its validator set in a distributed fashion. A mechanism that decentralizes Lido’s validator set will require robust identity management and authentication methods. To this end, Lido DAO agreed to fund Nethermind in delivering a systematization of knowledge for decentralized identities and verifiable credentials. This will be the first step towards an informed design of a mechanism that fulfills Lido’s goals.
During this project, we investigated what the state-of-the-art is, what solutions could be used in practice, and how to use them. More specifically, after a preliminary examination of over 100 papers and protocols related to the fields mentioned earlier, we selected and studied a collection of 70 of them and placed the results in the following database: Decentralized Identity and Verifiable Credential systems. The papers in the database have been analyzed as follows:
Let us now give a more detailed picture of Decentralized Identities, including their advantages and the mechanisms (such as DIDs and VCs) that govern them. As previously stated, Decentralized Identity is a type of identity management system where users are the owners of their private data that they store in a digital wallet, with the option to prove claims about these data to potential verifiers. “Decentralized Identity” is used interchangeably with the term “Self-Sovereign Identity” (SSI).
Following the analysis of different types of identity management systems, we will discuss the components of Decentralized Identities and, based on an introductory article by Dock Labs, illustrate the advantages of Decentralized Identity compared to other systems.
Typically, an implementation of a decentralized identity system involves the following components:
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs): a cryptographically verifiable identifier created and managed by the user. The user can manage this identifier by using a private control key. Specifically, the DID is a URI (uniform resource identifier) that has a recommended structure specified by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C):
In the DID above, we see the following components:
DID document: It contains information about the Decentralized Identity of the user, such as attributes or authentication methods. It can be updated by the user via their private control key.
According to the W3C standard, it corresponds to a JSON, like the following example:
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{
"@context": [
"<https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1>",
"<https://w3id.org/security/suites/ed25519-2020/v1>"
]
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
"authentication": [{
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1",
"type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2020",
"controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
"publicKeyMultibase": "zH3C2AVvLMv6gmMNam3uVAjZpfkcJCwDwnZn6z3wXmqPV"
}]
}Example 1: A simple DID document. Source: “Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0 W3C recommendation”. Copyright 2022 W3C (MIT, ERCIM, Keio, Beihang). W3C liability, trademark, and permissive document license rules apply.
In the above example, we see how the DID document is bound to the DID via the “id” entry. An “authentication” entry also contains a public key. If the user holds the respective private key and signs messages with it, they can assert ownership of the associated identity.
Verifiable data registry: Commonly a blockchain, it is used to record the DIDs and DID documents.
Verifiable Credentials (VCs): a cryptographically secure, digital version of credentials (paper or digital) that users can present to possible verifiers. This digital version should comply with Verifiable Credentials DataModel v1.1. We will explain the mechanisms behind VCs more thoroughly in the next section.
Decentralized Identity Wallet: an application that allows users to create their DIDs and the associated DID documents, and store related keys, data, and verifiable credentials.
The following diagram on decentralized identifiers, provided by the W3C, may shed light on how all the pieces fit together:
For clarification, let us note that:
The above overview characterizes how decentralized identities are stored and accessed via DIDs. However, we can construct a higher level of functionality — that of authentication. When we think of how identities are used and proven in the physical world, we note that the subject normally shows a credential — issued by an authorized party — that also certifies attributes about themselves (e.g., date of birth). This credential’s authenticity is verified by a third party at that time, accepting the subject’s claims about their identity if the credential is deemed legitimate.
The same three-party paradigm — with a user (or holder/subject), an issuer, and a verifier — can be employed in the world of decentralized identities and gives rise to the concept of verifiable credentials. In a nutshell, verifiable credentials work as follows:
Once again, W3C provides us with a diagram of the entire process:
We note that the “presentation” in step 3 may take on different levels of complexity, depending on the privacy the holder wishes to maintain. In the simplest scenario, the holder shows the verifiable credential to the verifier. More generally, the holder can construct a verifiable presentation, a tamper-evident presentation derived from the data inside the credential, authenticated by cryptography. Examples and use cases include:
We now focus on the data sources that can be used to construct a decentralized identity. Among these, we’ve mentioned how we may use inputs from Web2 to achieve this. Examples include a reputation score on Reddit, the number of stars on repositories created by a user on GitHub, and even the existence of an open TLS connection with a government website, which the user presents as evidence of citizenship of a given country.
In the Web3/blockchain context, one reason to be interested in bridging Web2 data to Web3 is that it may provide some degree of resistance to a Sybil attack — that is, the ability for a malicious entity on a decentralized protocol to create an arbitrary number of identities and gain disproportionate influence over it. If, for instance, we require a decentralized identity to bridge a reputation score from Web2 that is valuable enough, then this mechanism can complicate the creation of numerous identities by a single entity.
Besides Web2, there are alternative sources of off-chain information that one may attempt to transfer to Web3 to create an identity. Among these, we count government IDs, institutional credentials, and even biometrics. The goal behind using this data remains the same — using valuable sources to facilitate the identification and obfuscate the creation of Sybils.
The main technical challenge when following this approach is: How do we pull this data in a verifiable way so that the system is not likely to be exploited? For example: are oracles to be used? If so, what incentivization mechanism is used to enforce their honesty?
Due to their potential for building Sybil-resistant solutions (and for making decentralized identities more meaningful as a whole), we have paid special attention to implementations that explore transferring identity data to Web3 in a trustless or verifiable way.
Finally, we highlight a selection of database papers — rated as highly relevant and recommended as a starting point for reading.
This is one of the first papers discussing the problem of Sybil nodes in a network. It outlines how powerful Sybil nodes could be if we require the network nodes to control a given amount of resources for identity authentication. Furthermore, it shows that malicious nodes can easily spin off an unlimited number of nodes if the only requirement to access the network is the possession of resources checked on an irregular basis.
Next, we present some papers that aim to standardize how decentralized identifiers and verifiable credentials look. This effort, led mostly by W3C, is tremendously important since the lack of standardization may redeem identifiers useless. If we want people to use verifiable credentials, we must ensure they are as widely recognized as possible.
The next piece comes from Vitalik et al. The authors discuss tokens bound to Web3 identities. Soulbond tokens can potentially change the landscape of Web3 and make it more identity-oriented.
The problem with most classical papers on verifiable credentials is the centralized issuer which does not fully embrace the decentralized potential of Web3. The following article deals with this issue by showing how to decentralize that party.
Sometimes the credentials need to be revoked. Most VC schemes deal with revocation as follows: the system keeps a list of all revoked certificates, and the user needs to show that their credentials are not on that list. The following paper explains how to accelerate this process, and without the need to interact with the user — the verifier can check on its own whether the issuer revoked the credentials.
The next set of papers is of immense importance. They deal with the problem of getting Web2 data to Web3. There is a lot of data in Web2, yet most of it is hidden behind a TLS protocol. In other words, it is accessible to users, but those cannot show it in a verifiable manner to other parties. This is because the TLS protocol establishes a symmetric cryptography-based connection between the user and the server. The papers aim to solve that problem by allowing the user to include a verifier in the communication with a server who could verify the correctness of data.
Even with a set of magnificent papers, Web3 wouldn’t progress without the implementation effort of several teams and companies. Here we name only a few, but there are more exciting projects to follow in our database.
Kindly note, the above work has been developed by Nethermind Research as Phase 1 of its project to deliver a Systematization of Knowledge for Decentralized Identities and Verifiable Credentials. The project is funded by Lido DAO (original proposal). The above article does not indicate Nethermind’s endorsement of any particular paper, project, product or team. No representation or warranty, express or implied, is given by Nethermind as to the accuracy or completeness of the information or opinions contained in the above article, or in any of the referenced papers, projects or products. The article, its content, access, and/or usage thereof, including any associated services or materials, shall not be relied on for any purpose by any third party, in particular (without limitation) as any form of financial, investment, tax, legal, regulatory, or other advice. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Nethermind disclaims any liability in connection with this article, its content, and any related services and products and your use thereof.
• Decentralized identity. (n.d.). Retrieved: December 13, 2022
• Verifiable credentials data model V1.1. W3C. (2022, March 3). Retrieved: December 13, 2022.
• Decentralized identifiers (dids) v1.0. W3C. (2022, July 19). Retrieved: December 13, 2022.
• DID Specification Registries. (2022, November 30). Retrieved: December 13, 2022.
• Douceur, J. R. (2002, October 10). The Sybil Attack. SpringerLink. Retrieved: December 13, 2022.
• Deco. DECO. (n.d.). Retrieved: December 13, 2022.
• Own your identities. Sismo. (n.d.). Retrieved: December 13, 2022.
• Anti-sybil as a service. Interep. (n.d.). Retrieved: December 13, 2022.
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